


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Senegal Handbook

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W A R N I N G

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MAP

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INTRODUCTION

Located on the western bulge of Africa, the Republic of Senegal encompasses an area of some 76,000 square miles. Senegal was France's oldest colony in Africa and served for many years as the base for French penetration and development in West Africa. Until 1960, Dakar—the capital—was the administrative, commercial, and cultural center of the entire region. At that time the hinterland was divided into eight independent states, and the economic and political importance of the newly independent Senegal decreased drastically.

Senegal's one-crop agricultural economy has made little headway since independence, and the country's future prospects are bleak. Persistent economic malaise has led to smoldering political unrest, which in recent years has increasingly erupted into violence. The only hopeful sign in the country's economic firmament is the industrial sector, particularly the fishing and extractive industries, both of which have shown progress. Dakar has been seeking to diversify its sources of investment, but the French will probably retain their economic pre-eminence for the foreseeable future.

Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's first and only president, has dominated the political scene since the late 1940s, when his party—a precursor of the UPS—was overwhelmingly elected to represent the country in the French Parliament and later at local levels. Senghor has proved to be a skilled politician, carefully balancing Senegal's highly competitive political, economic, and religious interest groups. The President has succeeded in giving the country a decade of stability, but has been stymied by his inability to offer much in the way of economic advancement. The deteriorating relations between the Senghor regime and the economically powerful Muslim brotherhoods—at one time one of the major pillars of the regime—is in large part a result of the country's continuing economic malaise for which the Muslims hold the President responsible.

Although the Senghor regime has so far successfully weathered all major challenges to its authority, there are signs of increasing unrest, particularly among youth. The vanguard of these dissidents are Dakar University students who have long been in fundamental disagreement with the regime's conservative, pro-French orientation. The youthful radicals have been unable to mount a serious threat to the government, however, except in 1968 when they temporarily succeeded in working in partnership with the labor movement. Meanwhile, the government's carrot-and-stick approach has wooed most labor leaders toward its side.

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In foreign affairs Senegal, while professing nonalignment, actually leans toward the West, in particular toward France with which it has close cultural, intellectual, economic, and political ties. Under increasing pressure from Senegal's younger generation to decrease the country's dependence on France, Senghor has been cautiously searching for alternatives. In Africa, Senegal sides with the moderates on most major issues. It maintains formal relations with the USSR and a number of other Communist governments, but President Senghor is basically suspicious of the Communists and their representatives are watched closely. Although Senghor has long distrusted the Chinese Communists, he supported their membership in the UN—at the expense of Taiwan—in late 1971, and there are indications that Dakar and Peking may soon exchange ambassadors.

Senegal's 6,800-man armed forces plus its 3,000-man national police have thus far proved to be reliable defenders of the established order. Their primary mission is to maintain internal security, and they have demonstrated that they are able to deal forcefully and effectively with domestic dissidence. The chief of staff, General Diallo, and most of the military are unswervingly loyal to President Senghor. The security forces are still almost entirely dependent on France for materiel, logistic support, and training. In addition, France's continued military presence on the strategic Cap Vert peninsula and its defense commitments to Senegal serve to discourage any potential internal or external aggressors.

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GEOGRAPHY

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I. GEOGRAPHY

Location

Senegal is located on the western bulge of Africa; the peninsula on which its capital city, Dakar, is situated is the western extremity of the continent. The country is bounded by the Atlantic on the west, separated from Mauritania on the north by the Senegal River, and bordered on the east by Mali and on the south by Guinea and Portuguese Guinea. The independent republic of The Gambia penetrates more than 200 miles into Senegal and cuts the country off from its southern province.

Area

Covering an area of 76,000 square miles, Senegal is about the size of South Dakota. It extends about 365 miles on an east-west axis and about 280 miles on a north-south axis.

Climate

The country has two well-defined dry and humid seasons resulting from alternating winds from the northeast in the winter and from the southwest in the summer. Dakar's annual rainfall of about 24 inches occurs between June and October when maximum temperatures average between 81 and 89 degrees F; December to February minimum temperature ranges are greater along the coast, while elsewhere the annual average rainfall varies from about 10 inches in the north to 70 inches in the south. Sudden thunderstorms with heavy downpours are frequent in periods of seasonal change.

Topography

Senegal consists mostly of rolling plains with savannah-type vegetation and an altitude generally less than 650 feet. In the southeast, however, plateaus rise to elevations of 1,600 feet to form the foothills of the Fouta-Djalori Mountains. Marshy swamps interspersed with tropical rain forest are common in the southwest. The northern coast is almost straight; farther south it is marshy and indented by many estuaries. Senegal is drained by four major rivers: the Senegal, Saloum, Gambia, and Casamance, each of which is navigable by oceangoing vessels for a substantial distance.

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Natural resources

Senegal's agricultural resources are its main natural assets. Large phosphate deposits are the second most important earner of foreign exchange. Among various agricultural products raised, peanuts dominate, accounting for almost half of total agricultural production and the bulk of the farmers' monetary income, while providing some 70% of the country's export earnings. Cereals, chiefly millet and sorghum, are the main food crops. Government attempts to diversify agricultural production have had mixed success; cotton cultivation, introduced in 1963, is cited as a successful venture, but rice cultivation has proved to be a disappointment. Other potential assets are the country's substantial water resources, which offer plentiful supplies of fish for domestic consumption and for export, as well as providing future sources of hydroelectric power. The country's sizable livestock industry has grown rapidly over the past decade but is still far from being fully exploited. Efforts to find alternate sources of wealth have so far yielded few results. An American oil prospecting team conducting offshore drilling in late 1970 reportedly was pessimistic about finding commercially exploitable quantities of oil. Other prospecting teams, including a Soviet group, have been combing the country's desolate interior region for gold, diamonds, and other minerals, but so far no major finds have been reported.

Human resources

Senegal, in common with most other black African countries, has a relatively young but poorly educated and mostly unskilled population. Unlike the majority of other black African countries, however, Senegal's long domination by the French resulted in a legacy of highly educated indigenous personnel, especially in the professions and administrative affairs. Population was estimated at 4,029,000 in January 1972, and was increasing at about 2.3% annually. Six major tribes compose 95% of Senegal's total population. By far the largest of these is the Wolof (36%), followed by the Fulani (17.5%), Serer (16.5%), Tukulor (9.0%), Dyola (9.0%), and Malinke (6.5%). There are estimated to be about 48,000 non-Africans in Senegal, two thirds of whom are French. The remainder are other Europeans, Syrians, and Lebanese. Most non-Africans live in Dakar or other large cities. Population density varies widely, ranging from a scant 5 per square mile in the arid and inhospitable eastern regions to 3,150 per square mile in the area around Dakar. The active population, estimated at 1.7 million, is mainly employed in the rural sector. Substantial migration to the urban centers, particularly Dakar, has begun largely because of rural underemployment, and the urban population, estimated at 748,000 in 1969, makes up almost one fifth of the

total population. Dakar, the country's fastest growing metropolitan area, is one of West Africa's major seaports and contains the region's largest industrial complex. The city's population has reached an estimated 600,000 inhabitants and continues to increase as industry lures underemployed and unemployed youth and farmers. Only four other Senegalese cities have populations of more than 40,000: Kaolack, Thies, Rufisque, and Saint Louis.

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ECONOMIC
BACKGROUND

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II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Growth and trends

Senegal's economy has grown little in recent years, mainly because of poor weather conditions and unfavorable prices for peanuts. The annual rate of growth probably averaged less than 1% between 1963 and 1969. Programs to increase productivity in the peanut sector have been undertaken, and the authorities hope to diversify agricultural production and expand industrial activities. The success of these policies, to be implemented within the framework of a new four-year plan begun in 1969, will be of key importance to the future growth of the economy. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has risen from US \$678 million in 1963 to US \$720 million in 1969 (in constant prices), but per capita income declined over the same period because of population growth. Senegal has never regained the pre-eminent commercial and political position it held in France's West African empire.

Income distribution

The fragmentary data on employment that are available suggest that there are gross disparities in the distribution of income. The economically active population according to estimates made in 1968—is composed of approximately 1.7 million Africans, about 90% of whom were employed in the rural sector where they engaged in semisubsistence agriculture, and some 18,000 non-Africans. Total employment in the monetary sector was about 105,000 in 1971 (around 6.2% of the economically active population). Almost half were employed by private industry, one third by the government, and one fifth by public enterprises. Most of the country's cash income goes to some 35,000 civil servants and to persons engaged in Senegal's most active industrial and commercial sector, the purchase, sale, and milling of peanuts and peanut by-products. Unemployment and underemployment are among the country's most serious problems and are largely responsible for the steady flow of migrants to the urban areas.

Main sectors—trends in agriculture and industry

Agriculture—Agriculture, which is the mainstay of the Senegalese economy and employs about 90% of the labor force, has been experiencing serious difficulties. During the last decade, the growth of traditional food crops has been unable to keep pace with population growth, and early indications suggest that the 1970s will bring no improvement. Bad weather

conditions, the loss of the French peanut subsidy, and the rural exodus have all had adverse effects on agriculture. Peanuts (including processing) account for almost 20% of GDP and 70% of exports, and any shortfall in production is bound to have a serious effect on the over-all economy.

Manufacturing—Senegal has a relatively well-developed industrial sector, evidenced by the high proportion of manufacturing in GDP—13.5% between 1965 and 1968. France, which used Senegal as its regional headquarters in West Africa, established an industrial base on the Cape Verde Peninsula before World War II. The French presence continues to be manifest in all major manufacturing enterprises because of Senegal's need for French capital and skills. Since independence, the Senegalese, with French help, have expanded the capacity of certain industries, particularly footwear, food processing, textiles, chemicals, cement, oil refining, and automotive assembly. The government has also built a fertilizer plant in an effort to reduce its dependence on imports. Oil mills, which account for about 30% of total industrial production, have been operating at less than capacity because of the poor peanut crops in recent years. Although the decreased purchasing power in the rural areas has led to a decline in the domestic sale of textiles, increased exports of textiles to neighboring countries has more than offset this loss. Overall, the output of the manufacturing sector, excluding oil mills and canneries, increased by 8% in 1969, and appears to be doing well in the early years of the 1970s.

A semipublic industrial development company (SONEPI) was created in 1969 to promote small- and medium-sized industry and to encourage foreign participation in Senegalese enterprises. The company has already started a program of management training and has prepared feasibility studies for selected industrial projects. A special fund, designed to give Senegalese businessmen access to bank credit, has also reportedly been established. Prompted by a growing Senegalese business class whose demands for rapid "Senegalization" have become more persistent, the government announced in late 1970 that it was setting aside 35 trades—mainly in commerce—exclusively for Senegalese nationals, which traditionally have been dominated by the French and Lebanese.

Transportation and communications

Senegal's transportation and telecommunications systems are adequate for the country's present stage of development. All major communications systems originate in Dakar, Senegal's commercial and industrial metropolis and one of West Africa's busiest ports. The government-owned railroad

system, which extends for some 700 miles, connects essential points of Dakar, Saint Louis, and the Malian border town of Kidira with the railroad center in Thies. Other branches run deep into the interior where they serve the peanut production centers at Kaolack, Linguere, and Touba, as well as the phosphate works at Taiba. Senegal's road network, consisting of about 1,300 miles of paved roads and about 1,100 miles of improved earth roads that provide connections with highway systems of Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Portuguese Guinea, and The Gambia, is comparatively advanced for this part of Africa. The highways serve chiefly as feeder lines to the railroad.

Inland waterways are widely used to move agricultural products from deep in the interior of Senegal to maritime ports. The Senegal River, extending along the Mauritanian border and into Mali, is the only important international waterway connection.

Seventeen airfields are scattered throughout Senegal. The most important facility is Dakar-Yoff, where 3 runways are equipped to handle all types of jet traffic. The country's telecommunications facilities—with connections to Paris—provide limited coverage and barely meet the country's needs. Nevertheless, these facilities compare favorably with those of other underdeveloped African states. A skeletal open-wire line system is supplemented by one radio-relay link and a few radio-communication stations.

Government economic policy and financial systems

Over-all objectives of the government in the economic area are: reduction of inequalities in income between rural and urban areas; furtherance of cooperative movements; and establishment of national enterprises to supplement the private sector. A self-proclaimed African socialist, President Senghor is a pragmatist in economic matters. He still relies heavily on French expertise in running the economy and has sought to retain French entrepreneurs in areas where Senegalese skills and capital are lacking. The government encourages foreign investment by offering a liberal investment code which grants general guarantees and tax advantages for new investments, but the limited resources of the country and the small domestic market militate against large inflows of foreign capital. Senghor has emphasized the importance of agricultural expansion and crop diversification, but it is the agricultural demonstration programs of foreign technicians that have been mainly responsible for what little progress has been made toward decreasing the dependency of the economy on peanut production.

The government attempts to regulate the economy through four-year plans have thus far met with little success. Government control over both the purchasing and selling of the country's major crop—peanuts—is ensured through a state-run agency. Additionally, the state owns and operates the country's only railroad and its telecommunications services; the West African Water and Electric Co., the country's major producer of electric power, recently was nationalized.

Senegal is a member of the franc zone, and its currency, the CFA franc, is fully convertible with the French franc. Senegal shares with six other franc zone states a common central bank, the Central Bank of the States of West Africa (BCEAO), established with French assistance and located in Paris. Aid from France—averaging about \$30 million annually—has come in the form of grants, loans, technical assistance, and budgetary support. This aid played a vital role in the financing of Senegal's development efforts. Substantial assistance is also provided by the World Bank and UN agencies. Senegal remains committed to cooperate in regional economic development with the states of the Senegal River basin despite the collapse of the Organization of Senegal River States in late 1971. Senegal is also a member of the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization and the West African Economic Community.

Foreign trade

Neither exports nor imports have shown any sizable expansion during the past decade. During the past five years, exports have averaged 20% of GDP and imports some 25%. Senegal's main exports are peanuts and peanut products, canned fish, and phosphates. Taken together, these account for more than 80% of the total. The country's meager resources necessitate the importation of most raw materials, including a major portion of its foodstuffs—mainly rice—and virtually all machinery and equipment. France is by far the most important trade partner of Senegal, although Senegal's export trade with France has declined as a percentage of the total during the past decade (from 76% in 1961 to 60% in 1969). France is likewise Senegal's main supplier, providing 40% of imports in 1969. The other five EEC countries accounted for 11% of Senegal's exports in 1969, representing an increase of 5% since 1961. Trade with Communist nations over the same period was negligible.

Balance of payments

The balance of payments has been in substantial deficit since 1966 largely because of the growing trade deficit resulting from a continued rise in

imports and a decrease in peanut exports. As a result, Senegal has had to draw on French banking reserves to meet its commitments. Procurement of capital equipment from France and other countries plus price increases after the devaluations of the French and CFA francs were largely responsible for the increase in the price of imports. Export receipts, on the other hand, have fallen, primarily because of the sizable drop in peanut exports since 1966. Although exports of other products more than doubled between 1967 and 1969, the country's heavy dependence on peanuts, the lack of other promising sources of exports, and the continuing need to import foodstuffs all work against an improvement in the country's balance of payments.

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POLITICAL
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AND TRENDS

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III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS

Historical summary

Before 1960: Various pressures over the centuries had gradually forced the Wolof, Serer, and Tukulor peoples to migrate from the northeast into present day Senegal. European activity in the area began with the arrival of the Portuguese at Cape Verde Peninsula and the Gambia River in the mid-15th century. In the mid-16th century the Dutch arrived, and they were followed a century later by the French.

Senegal was the only French African colony that had elected governing councils before World War II, and the first to send a deputy to the French National Assembly (Blaise Diagne in 1914). Unlike their practice in other African colonies, the French made a real effort to educate the Senegalese. In the 1850s, they established a school system which, although small, was able to prepare selected Africans for study at any university in France. As a result, generations ago a sizable educated African elite had emerged, and its members had begun to think of themselves as Senegalese rather than as members of particular ethnic groups. Consequently, the leaders of modern Senegal were ahead of their confreres in other African countries in trying to develop national consciousness among their people.

Senegal was the first African country in which France established representative institutions that provided some opportunities for political participation. In the latter part of the 19th century, four Senegalese coastal towns were given the status of French communes, with their residents receiving all the perquisites of Frenchmen, including the right to vote for a deputy to the French parliament. Three of these four were also allowed to elect their own mayors and municipal councils. (No other French commune in Africa was granted this privilege until 1955). Meanwhile, however, Africans in the "bush" were, until 1946, of "subject" status.

In 1946, Senegal became an Overseas Territory of the French Republic within the new French Union. The distinction between "citizen" and "subject" was abolished, and French citizenship was extended to all Africans outside the original communes. Senegal's representation in the French National Assembly was increased from one to two. At the territorial level, the former advisory colonial council became an elected General Council, much as in a French department. From 1945 onward, France gradually extended the franchise first to veterans, civil servants, chiefs, holders of school certificates, and gradually including more and more special categories until suffrage became universal in 1957.

Leopold Senghor, a protégé of one of Senegal's most illustrious politicians, Lamine Gueye, entered upon the political scene after World War II as Gueye's running mate for Senegal's two seats in the French parliament. Senghor subsequently broke with Gueye because of what he felt was Gueye's alienation from the people and his close association with the French, and formed his own party in 1948. Senghor at first directed his appeal primarily to the newly enfranchised rural people with whom he shared a common heritage. But by independence in 1960 he had succeeded in gathering together Senegal's disparate political elements into a single party and was the most prominent political figure. The loi cadre of 1956 gave Senegal a considerable measure of internal autonomy, providing it with its own executive council. Senegal became an autonomous republic within the new Franco-African Community in November 1958. In 1959, Senegal and the French Sudan (now Mali) formed the Federation of Mali. France granted the Mali Federation independence on 20 June 1960, but two months later the federation broke up over political differences.

1960-1971: Independent Senegal. An abortive coup by Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in December 1962 strengthened President Senghor's position as chief executive and led to the abolition of the prime minister's office for several years. Since the coup attempt, Senghor has remained on top, drawing support from the country's military, its major economic interests, and his former French mentors, whose financial assistance has kept the country economically viable. Political malaise has increased, however, because of the basically grim economic picture and the country's excessive dependence on the French. The student and labor riots that flared up in the summer of 1968 seriously challenged the regime. (After these two politically active groups had threatened further violence, Senghor finally moved to meet some of their demands). The most ominous development in Senegalese politics since independence, however, has been the gradual erosion of Senghor's support from his traditional allies, the Muslim chiefs and the peasantry, and his increasing reliance on the military to contain spreading dissidence.

Governmental system

The Senegalese Government is modeled after the French Fifth Republic. The constitution proclaims that the government shall be chosen by the people, and the people are guaranteed the rights of liberty, equality, and religious freedom. The president holds the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and his cabinet, and all proposals submitted to the National Assembly by the prime minister must be countersigned by the president. In addition, the president has control over the army, may rule by decree during emergencies, and is responsible for appointments at all levels of the government. President Senghor recently has named a number of young technicians to lesser cabinet posts as a sop to the youthful educated elite.

The country's legislature—the National Assembly—is a unicameral body, whose members are elected by universal suffrage for five-year terms at the same time as the president. This 80-member body has the right to initiate legislation along with the executive and has control over the budget and taxes. A vote of censure by an absolute majority of its members can bring down the government, but in the past it has routinely approved the president's proposals with a minimum of debate.

The Senegalese judicial system is closely patterned after its French counterpart, but is modified by customary law at the local level. The judicial system remains—theoretically at least—independent of the executive and the legislature. All magistrates are appointed for life by the President. At the top of the judicial pyramid is the Supreme Court which rules on the constitutionality of laws, on international treaties, on jurisdictional disputes between the other two branches of government, and even audits the government's books.

Senegal is administered by a highly centralized bureaucracy headquartered in Dakar, but for administrative purposes is subdivided into seven regions, 28 departments, and 90 arrondissements. Each region is headed by a governor appointed by the president. The governor is assisted by a regional development committee consisting of two deputies and the president of the regional assembly. The administrators of the lesser subdivisions are also presidential appointees and are answerable only to him.

Political dynamics

Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS): Status—The constitution omits any mention of political parties and, therefore, at least in theory, more than one party might be expected to exist. In practice, however, the Senghor government has authorized only one party—the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) headed by President Senghor.

Formation—In 1948, Senghor broke his ties with established political leaders to form a new political party, known as the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (BDS), which was supported largely by rural areas. After a series of mergers, in 1958 the party changed its name to the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS). UPS nominees for governmental positions face no opposition and are ensured election once they make the electoral lists. The party continues to retain its rural base—drawing most of its support from local clan and religious leaders, the peasants, and various middle class and minority groups. The party, however, is racked by factional infighting and is further

debilitated by a split between its old, predominantly rural, hard-line faction and a younger, more reformist faction. Moreover, the party's firm grasp of all governmental posts and the complete absence of competition have tended, in recent years, to make the party complacent and unresponsive to the needs of its constituents.

Organization—The UPS has a hierarchy of committees extending from the local to the national level. At the top are a National Congress, a National Council, and a Political Bureau. In the 70-man Political Bureau, the actual center of power within the party, issues are freely discussed and decisions are made by majority vote. The UPS organization parallels that of the government, and there is considerable overlapping of personnel between the two. Although the UPS claims to be the main link between the government and the people, it is neither dynamic nor representative. Instead, it consists of old-line political figures and is primarily responsive to wealthy, conservative landowners.

Program—The UPS is a moderate party, sponsoring platforms generally based on those of the French Socialist Party. Since assuming power, it has promised to reform economic and social conditions, but in practice has favored private enterprise, including foreign investment in commerce and light industry. All major opposition elements, except for certain recalcitrant groups which have been outlawed by the government for activities deemed inimical to the state, have been absorbed by the UPS. President Senghor views the party as the single most important link between the masses and the regime and has attempted to absorb all potential pressure groups by providing party branches for youth, women, and labor.

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SUBVERSION

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IV. SUBVERSION

In the decade since independence, the moderate regime of President Senghor has faced three serious crises. At the start of the decade, former prime minister Mamadou Dia attempted a coup, in 1967 an attempt was made—allegedly by Dia's followers—to assassinate the President, and most recently, the country has suffered from persistent economic and political malaise marked by labor-student unrest. In each instance, the support of the country's military and paramilitary forces plus Senghor's own political acumen have enabled the regime to remain in power. Senegalese students, particularly those at Dakar University—a center of antiregime activity—oppose the regime and openly advocate its overthrow because they feel that the government has failed to make needed reforms and has maintained too close relations with the French. The authorities have attempted through a carrot-and-stick approach to win the students over, but without success. Students will probably remain the greatest potential threat to the regime.

Government measures against the country's labor movement, including the establishment of a rival union, temporarily at least have nullified labor as a source of opposition. Only the teachers' union—a small segment of the labor movement—remains recalcitrant, and it poses no serious threat to the government. Attempts to forge an antiregime labor-student coalition so far have failed to make any headway.

Heavily armed anti-Portuguese rebels based in Senegal's isolated southern province have created a serious security problem. These rebel bands, primarily targeted against Portuguese Guinea, have committed numerous depredations against the local populace, many of whom are refugees from Portuguese Guinea. Senegalese authorities occasionally have clamped down on rebel activities but are incapable of controlling them completely.

Communist party

There is no Communist party in Senegal, but the crypto-Communist African Independence Party (PAI), outlawed since 1959, has continued to engage in limited antigovernment activity from neighboring countries. The PAI tends to reflect Soviet thinking because of its ties to the French Communist party, which is probably its main source of support. Since 1960 party members have been faced with arrest in Senegal, and those not fleeing the country have either been bought off by the government or imprisoned. The PAI in the past has smuggled antigovernment tracts into the country.

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These papers have occasionally surfaced during student disorders, indicating that there is still some residual support for the PAI among the students. The PAI was never able to gain mass support, largely because many of the party's officials were out of touch with the peasants and urban masses. Constant police monitoring of PAI activity and police infiltration of its ranks have rendered it relatively ineffectual. Although its total membership is not known, the PAI probably has less than a thousand active members.

The PAI, like other Senegalese political parties is divided. In 1965, a group of PAI dissenters espousing a pro-Peking line broke away and founded the Senegalese Communist Party (PCS). The PCS, also banned, has shown even less organizational skill than the PAI.

Foreign activities

Senegal maintains relations with a number of Communist countries, including the USSR, North Vietnam, and Poland. The Senegalese remain wary of Soviet activity, and the movement of Soviet officials and the flow of Soviet propaganda are subjected to close scrutiny. In 1969, the Senegalese—piqued by the treatment of President Senghor's much vaunted philosophy of negritude in the Soviet media—waged a brief but sharp war of words with Moscow. Senegalese sensitivity about the activities of any foreigners, but particularly those from the Communist world, was highlighted in 1968 during the labor-student troubles. At that time, two New China News Agency staffers, based in Dakar, were expelled from the country because of their alleged involvement with the disorders. Toward the end of 1970, the government banned almost all propaganda activities of the Communist countries and tended to blame much of the country's growing unrest on "foreign influences."

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ARMED FORCES

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VI. ARMED FORCES

Organization and manpower

Constitutionally, President Senghor has ultimate control over Senegal's armed forces. Senghor turned over the defense portfolio to the prime minister, who is directly accountable to him, when the office of prime minister was reinstalled in 1970. But, in fact, it is Commanding General and Chief of Staff Diallo who controls the army and is the de facto minister of the armed forces. Although technically accountable to the prime minister, Diallo is well entrenched in the administration and has authority to act on his own in all ministry matters except those dealing with the creation of laws and the appointment of certain top level civil servants. Diallo has proved to be a loyal supporter of the Senghor regime, despite occasional differences with the President.

The armed forces total of about 6,800 men is composed of a 5,100-man army, a 150-man navy, and a 160-man air force plus a paramilitary component, and a 1,350-man gendarmerie. In addition, there is a 3,300-man Surete Nationale or National Police—subordinate to the Interior Minister—which since 1969 has included the elite presidential guard unit—the Garde Republicaine. The military manpower potential is estimated at about 930,000 males between ages 15 and 49, of whom about 48% are considered physically fit for duty. There is a compulsory service law requiring military service of 18 months, but volunteers usually oversubscribe the available slots.

Mission and capability

The mission of the armed forces is to ensure domestic order and defend the country's territorial integrity. The Senegalese ground forces have practically no capability for any defensive or offensive actions against a well-equipped, hard-hitting strike force like the Portuguese in neighboring Portuguese Guinea. Moreover, the armed forces are almost entirely dependent on the French for logistic and even administrative support. Senegal's armed and paramilitary forces would probably be able to handle most situations without seeking French intervention, however.

Equipment and logistics

Senegal has no domestic weapons production and has no facilities to produce its own weapons. Arms and ammunition, most of World War II

vintage and some produced in the United States, are provided by the French Military Assistance Program. The available equipment is in fair condition, and the Senegalese maintenance personnel are fairly well trained, although major repairs still must be done in France. The age and frequent use of much of the military's equipment create frequent maintenance problems. Small arms are the main part of the Senegalese arsenal, although in recent years the Senegalese have added some armored cars, recoilless rifles, French-built patrol craft, and helicopters.

Military budget

The defense budget for FY 1972 is \$18.0 million, 10.45% of the total budget of \$188 million compared to the 12.0% ratio for the FY-71 budget; it represents a 1% increase over last year's total amount. The defense budget continues gradually to increase, reflecting pressures on the Senegalese to upgrade their forces to counter any contingencies that might arise from the active guerrilla war in neighboring Portuguese Guinea.

Military agreements and aid

Under a defense agreement signed at independence in 1960, France has continued to provide for Senegal's basic defense needs. Sizable French paratrooper, naval, and air forces have been stationed on the Cape Verde Peninsula, and Paris has provided both training and military hardware to the Senegalese military forces. Since 1954, total French military assistance has totaled about \$20 million, mainly in grant aid. U.S. military assistance between 1962 and 1970, most of it for Senegal's civic action oriented engineer battalion, amounted to almost \$3 million. Senegal also has a special relationship with The Gambia requiring cooperation in the fields of defense and foreign affairs.

Security system

Under the constitution, the President has blanket authority to rule by decree should the internal situation seriously deteriorate. As commander in chief of the country's military and paramilitary forces, the President has sufficient force at his disposal to cope with most domestic disturbances. In addition to the 5,000-man French-trained army—the largest and most dependable force—the regime draws mostly upon its paramilitary forces, the 3,300-man surete (national police) whose efficiency has improved since the 1,500-man Garde Republicaine was incorporated into its ranks in 1969, and the 1,300-man gendarmerie. The French military presence in Dakar, consisting of army, navy and air force units, probably can be counted on to come to

the aid of the regime in an emergency. The over-all coordination of internal and external security is in the hands of a newly formed organization known as the Senegalese Security Council. The council, which meets at least once a month, makes recommendations to the President. Its membership is drawn from the President's office, the Army, the Interior Ministry, plus the President's military and security counselors, both Frenchmen.

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FOREIGN
RELATIONS

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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS

General

Senegal's foreign policy, though formally nonaligned, is oriented toward the West. Dakar's moderate approach reflects President Senghor's philosophy, which stresses dialogue as the most important means of settling disputes and which sees Senegal's role as a moderating influence between East and West. Dakar has scrupulously avoided involvement in East-West disputes and tends to concentrate on matters which affect its internal stability or its economic development. In recent years, the government has come under increasing domestic pressure to chart a more independent course in world affairs, but continued reliance on France, particularly for economic aid, militates against any sweeping changes in Senegalese foreign policy.

Africa

Senegal's primary focus continues to be on Africa, particularly West Africa. Senegal has been an active member of the Organization of African Unity and, especially, of the smaller, francophone grouping, the Common Organization of Africa, Malagasy and Mauritius (OCAM). Senegal's pressing internal problems—many stemming from economic causes—have forced Dakar to direct its main attention toward regionalism. President Senghor was a prime mover in the formation of the now collapsed four-state Organization of Senegal River States in March 1968. His hopes for this organization, upon which Senegal based much of its economic future, were unduly optimistic. Senegalese-Guinean disagreements, most recently over Senegal's refusal to repatriate anti-Guinean exiles, led to its collapse. Senegal's relationship with The Gambia, which it surrounds on three sides, has also been troubled. Differences between the economic systems of the two countries and the Gambians persistent footdragging on measures to curb the illicit trade between them occasionally have caused a cooling in relations. Until these basic issues are resolved within the context of a regional or bilateral economic agreement, relations between Dakar and Bathurst will be subjected to periodic buffeting. A much more serious problem exists between Senegal and Portugal over Portuguese actions resulting from the guerrilla war in Portuguese Guinea. Senegal, which has allowed anti-Portuguese rebels to use its territory, continues to complain of Portuguese violations of its borders. For their part, the Portuguese apparently hope to convince Dakar of the need to clamp down on rebel activity by demonstrating their capacity to strike against Senegalese border villages at will. This sore spot in relations between

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Lisbon and Dakar will probably continue as long as the guerrilla war in Portuguese Guinea drags on.

Communist countries

In order to preserve its nonaligned image, Dakar has sought diplomatic ties with a number of Communist countries. Most of these ties have led to commercial and cultural exchanges; the only significant aid the Senegalese have received has come from the USSR, which has agreed to finance a \$6.7 million tuna-fishing complex and also has provided some foodstuffs. Although Dakar formally recognized Communist China as early as 1961, diplomatic relations have not been established. Senegal did vote for the seating of China in the UN and the expulsion of Taiwan, but President Senghor harbors a deep distrust of the Chinese. During the 1968 student-labor disorders in Dakar, two Dakar-based New China News Agency correspondents were expelled for alleged involvement in the disorders. Despite suspicions of the Chinese, Senegal is expected soon to establish full diplomatic ties with Peking. In December 1969, Dakar recognized North Vietnam largely because of Senghor's sympathy with the North Vietnamese, with whom he feels he shares a common colonial heritage. The Senegalese have occasionally exhibited irritation with the activities of Communist diplomats, particularly those of the Soviet Union. Moscow maintains a sizable embassy in Dakar and conducts an active cultural program;

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Western countries

Despite its attempts to project a nonaligned image, Senegal is essentially Western-oriented. Senegal's historical, cultural and economic ties with France are still paramount. Paris remains Dakar's major trading partner and its main source of aid, mainly in the form of grants, loans, technical assistance and budgetary support. French aid is estimated to average between \$20 and \$25 million annually. Although Dakar has recently turned to other—mainly western—sources for economic assistance, its almost total dependence on France will probably continue for the foreseeable future. From its associate membership in the Common Market, Dakar has derived important economic benefits and has strengthened its economic ties with other Western European countries. Senegal's relations with the United States continue to be cordial. Dakar's increasingly difficult economic situation in the past few years have prompted the Senegalese to encourage more US public and private investment in their economy.


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